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The recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey' introduced common sense into the controversy over
the meaning of the term "market price" in gas leases. Ignoring sub-
stantial case law to the contrary in other jurisdictions, the court held
that the term "market price," under certain circumstances, was the con-
tract price at which the lessee sold the gas.2 Therefore, if the lease calls
for gas royalty based on the market price at the well, and the producer
has entered into a long-term, arm's length, good faith gas purchase con-
tract at the best price available at the time, that contract price is the
market price.3
Normally, oil and gas leases provide that the lessor will receive a
royalty based on either the market price or the proceeds.a Courts have
generally held that where royalties are based on "proceeds," proceeds
are defined in terms of the lessee's revenues. Where the royalty is
based on the "market price," however, it has been held that the market
price is the prevailing price at any given time for which gas could be
sold, regardless of the lessor's commitment to a long-term purchase
contract.5 Tara represents the first time that the meaning of "market
price" as it relates to royalties has been addressed in Oklahoma.6
An understanding of the background of this controversy is critical
to a realization of the importance of the Tara decision. In the early
1. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
2. Id. at 1272.
3. Id. at 1273.
4. See generally Fischl, Ascertaining the Value or Price of Gasfor Purposes of the Royalty
Clause, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 22 (1968). Market value refers to the current prevailing price; proceeds
refers to the amount received upon sale by the lessee.
5. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d I, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 876 (1977); Montana Power Co. v. Kravlik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978); Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
6. The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed a related issue in Apache Gas Products Corp.
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1973), where it held that, for the purpose of gross
production tax computation, the market price is the contract price. See notes 23-29 infra and
accompanying text.
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days of the gas industry, gas was viewed as little more than a waste
product.7 For this reason, and because of the costs of gas production, it
was frequently necessary for producers to enter long-term contracts in
order to sell the gas.8 These contracts usually called for a fixed price to
be paid during the term of the agreement with no provisions for future
price escalations. It was not possible for the parties to foresee the dra-
matic changes that would occur in the price of gas. The lessor receiving
a royalty based upon the contract price often became disgruntled be-
cause lessors who had negotiated leases later in time when gas prices
were higher were receiving substantially higher royalties.9
In response to the concerns of the lessor, some jurisdictions have
awarded increased royalties.1" These decisions have largely ignored
the producer who was locked into a fixed revenue by his long-term
contract and thus forced to use a larger and larger share of his income
to satisfy the lessor's demand for royalties. The Tara decision marks a
departure from this trend and recognizes the realities of the gas
industry.II
An analysis of the underlying policies of Tara and the manner in
which the Tara rule differs from prior decisions indicates that Tara
provides an equitable solution for both parties. 2
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tara presents a typical fact situation. The lessors brought suit for
additional royalties against the original lessee, the first purchaser, and
the producer.1 3 The lessors had executed the original lease to Tara Pe-
7. See, ag., Morris, The Gas Royalty Clause-What is the Market Value?, 25TH INST. ON OIL
& GAS L. & TAX 63 (1974); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (rex. Civ. App. 1978),
modgfed, 613 S.W.2d 240, rehearing, 619 S.W.2d 477 (1981).
8. See Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109, 112 (Okla.
1973); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (rex. Civ. App. 1978), mod#fed, 613
S.W.2d 240, rehearing, 619 S.W.2d 477 (1981).
9. 630 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Okla. 1981).
10. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1966) (royalties based on the
theoretical transaction between the supposed free buyer and seller rather than the actual transac-
tion); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968) (royalties based on the
prevailing market price at the time of the sale which was the time of delivery); Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), modfled, 613 S.W.2d 240, rehearing, 619
S.W.2d 477 (1981) (royalties based on several factors including comparable sales and expert testi-
mony regarding average price corroborated by comparable sales).
11. The same month the Third Circuit of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana reached a simi-
lar conclusion by way of a different analysis. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
12. An in-depth discussion of the various methods employed by other jurisdictions to calcu-
late royalties is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 10.
13. 630 P.2d 1269 at 1272. See infra note 18.
19821
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troleum in 1973. Through a series of assignments Tara Petroleum as-
signed the lease to Wilcoy Petroleum."4 Wilcoy successfully drilled a
producing gas well on the property in February of 1976 and that same
month entered into a gas purchase contract with Jarrett Oil Company.
This contract was for two years and extended automatically from year
to year thereafter unless terminated on the anniversary date upon
ninety days notice by either party.15
The royalties during the first two years were paid by Jarrett to the
lessors based upon the contract price. During the contract period Jar-
rett resold the gas to El Paso Natural Gas Company by a-contract
which called for the price to be the ceiling price allowed by the Federal
Power Commission,'6 rather than a fixed price. Five months after Jar-
rett began purchasing from Wilcoy, the FPC substantially raised the
ceiling price, enabling Jarrett to receive far more from El Paso Natural
Gas than the 31 cents or 32 cents per mcf it was paying Wilcoy under
the gas purchase contract. 7 The lessors brought suit alleging un-
derpayment of royalties.' 8 The District Court of Greer County
awarded the lessor additional royalties of $18,000 from Tara Petroleum
and Jarrett. 9 It is from this judgment that Tara Petroleum and Jarrett
appealed.
The lessors based their claim for higher royalties on the following
market price royalty clause:
[T]he said lessee covenants and agrees. . . . To pay lessor for
14. Id. at 1271. Tara retained an override of 1/8th royalty of 7/8th working interest and the
right to purchase any gas at 3¢; per mcf. An override is defined as a given percentage of the pross
production payable to someone other than the lessor. It is generally applied to such a fractional
interest in the production of oil and gas as is created from the lessee's estate. La Laguna Ranch
Co. v. Dodge, 114 P.2d 351 (1941). In Oklahoma an override has been defined as a percentage
carved out of the lessee's working interest free and clear of production expenses. De Mik v. Car-
gill, 485 P.2d 229, 232 (Okla. 1971).
15. 630 P.2d at 1271. The contract between Jarrett and Wilcoy was in effect from March
1976 through February 1978. By this time gas prices had significantly risen. Although the con-
tract called for the seller, Wilcoy, to pay all royalties and overrides, the actual payments were
made by the buyer Jarrett. This fact was considered insignificant by the court because such prac-
tices are common in the industry. .d. at 1276.
16. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) sets ceiling prices in an effort to regulate the
interstate gas market pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976). See
infra note 71 and accompanying text.
17. The price during this period went to nearly $1.30 per mcf. 630 P.2d at 1271. Mcf refers
to thousand cubic feet and is the standard unit for measuring the value of natural gas.
18. Id. at 1269. Suit was brought against Tara Petroleum, Jarrett, Wilcoy, Brown, Pugh,
Steelman and Howard. Steelman and Howard aided Wilcoy financially. One defendant, Falcon
Oil & Gas Co., was dismissed from the suit. All but one of the original lessors dismissed their
actions.
19. Id. at 1272 (holding for the producers Wilcoy, Brown, Pugh, Steelman and Howard).
[Vol. 17:566
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gas of whatsoever nature and kind produced and sold or used
off the premises, or used in the manufacture of any products
therefrom, one-eighth (1/8) at the marketprice at the well for
the gas sold, used off the premises, or in the manufacture of
products therefrom, said payments to be made monthly
20
On appeal the meaning of the term "market price" in the royalty
clause and the amount of royalty for the two year period from 1976 to
1978 were at issue. The case raised the question of whether royalty
based upon "market price" is to be calculated from the prevailing mar-
ket rate in the field, or, as the lessee argued, on the contract price.2
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET VALUE CONTROVERSY
Although the issue has been decided in many jurisdictions,22 Tara
represents Oklahoma's first opportunity to deal with the market price
clause. In Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission23
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was faced with a related issue: whether
gross production tax was to be paid based upon the prevailing market
price or upon the contract price.24  The court, in interpreting
Oklahoma's Gross Production Tax Code,25 held that "the Commission
should apply the gross production tax to the gross proceeds realized by
each producer from his individual sales contracts, except where the
conditions under which a particular contract was entered into were
such as not to reflect arm's length bargaining . *,26
The Tax Commission had urged the court to interpret the statute
to base the tax due on the prevailing value of the gas. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that the Commission did not have the
right to collect taxes based on the current value. The court stated that
the statute was to be interpreted in light of such realities as the neces-
20. Id. (emphasis by the court).
21. Id.
22. See Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1981) and cases cited
in note 5 supra.
23. 509 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1973).
24. Id. at 116.
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68 § 1009(f) (1971) which states in part:
In case ... gas ... is sold under circumstances where the sale price does not repre-
sent the cash price thereof prevailing for... gas... of like kind, character or quality in
the field from which such product is produced, the Tax Commission may require the said
tax to [be] paid upon the basis of the prevailing price then being paid at the time of
production thereof in said field for.., gas... of like kind, quality and character.
26. 509 P.2d at 116.
1982]
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sity for long-term sales contracts.27 The statute must be interpreted to
permit the Commission to require the tax to be paid on the basis of
prevailing prices only in cases where the prices already paid are less
than the prevailing prices at the time for which the sales prices were
contracted.28 The Apache Gas rule suggested that the Oklahoma Court
might not follow the decisions of other jurisdictions in interpreting the
market price clause.29 It was not until Tara, however, that the court
had the opportunity to extend its approach inApache Gas to the market
price controversy as it pertained to gas royalties.
One of the early cases from another jurisdiction was Foster v. At-
lantic Refining Co.3 Foster is not, however, typical of the decisions on
the market price issue because it involved a lease which contained the
phrase "at the market price therefor prevailing for the field where
produced when run.''31 The lessee, Atlantic, had entered a long-term
gas sales contract under which it received less than the prevailing mar-
ket price. The lessor sued, claiming that the royalties based upon the
contract price did not reflect the market price when run.32 Even disre-
garding the fact that the contract price was below the prevailing market
price, in light of the words "when run," the decision in favor of the
lessor seems justifiable. The words "when run" refer to a specific time
when the royalties are to be measured and can hardly be interpreted
differently. The court stated, "It [Atlantic] made the gas sales contract
with full knowledge of this obligation and did nothing to protect itself
against increases in price." 33  As one author indicated, the impact of
the Foster decision on lessees was expected to be slight.34 The Foster
lease was not typical, and it appeared that a different result would be
obtained if the court had considered the standard lease.35
Another case where special terminology governed the result is J
M. Huber Corp. v. Denman36 Huber involved a gas purchase contract
which the lessee was required to obtain as a prerequisite to obtaining
the lease. The lease called for royalties based upon the market price,
27. Id. at 113.
28. Id.
29. See Ashabranner, The Oil and Gas Lease Royalty Clause-One-Eighth of What?, 20
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 163, 184 (1975).
30. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
31. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 489.
34. See Ashabranner, supra note 29, at 178.
35. Id.
36. 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 17:566
5
Crane: Market Value and Long-Term Purchase Contracts: Tara Petroleum Cor
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TARA PETROLEUM CORP. v. HUGHEY
"but in no event shall the price be computed at less than four cents per
thousand cubic feet."37
The lessee negotiated a contract calling for payment of 3-1/2 cents
per mcf until 1945 and for 4 cents thereafter. The contract was renego-
tiated in 1961 for a price of 11 cents per mcf. The lessee paid royalties
based on 4 cents rather than the contract price of 3-1/2 cents. After the
contract was renegotiated, he paid royalty based upon the 11 cents con-
tract price. The lessor brought suit to increase the royalties to the pre-
vailing current market price. Although the lessee argued that it was
forced into the long-term contract by the lessor and that the lessor
should be aware that the contract was designed to cover the term of the
lease, the court decided that, in determining market value, it would
look at the theoretical transactions between the supposed free buyer
and seller.38 Furthermore, the court stated that "the construction put
on the contract by responsible action. of the parties is frequently the
best revelation of its purpose."39  Because the lessee paid royalties
based upon the 4 cents floor price of the lease rather than the contract
price of 3-1/2 cents, and because earlier in the negotiations the parties
had rejected a "proceeds" clause,' it was clear that the parties did not
intend that royalties be based upon the contract price.41
The same year a Texas case, Texas Oil& Gas Corp. v. Vela,42 dealt
with the market value issue. In Vela the lease called for royalty to be
paid based on 1/8th of the market price at the wells of the amount sold
if the gas was sold or used off the premises; or 1/8th of the market
value on the gas if used for the manufacture of gasoline, and, finally, if
sold by the lessee, 1/8th of the proceeds.43 Two years after the lease
was executed, the lessees entered into long-term gas purchase contracts
for the gas. The contracts, which were to run the entire life of the lease,
37. Id. at 107 n.4.
38. Id. at 109. It was decided that in the case of a market value lease, the court would not
examine the "particular transaction but [would look at] the theoretical one between the supposed
free seller vis-A-vis the contemporary free buyer dealing freely at arm's length supposedly in rela-
tion to property which neither will ever own, buy or sell." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. Almost from the inception of the lease the royalties paid did not conform to the
contract price. This was strong evidence that the parties never intended for the contract price to
prevail. See Morris, supra note 7, at 71. However, in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So.
2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1981), the fact that the lessor had accepted without objection the payments
which were based on the contract price for seventeen years was evidence that the parties did
intend for the contract price to prevail. Id. at 606-07.
42. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
43. Id. at 870-71.
1982]
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called for a price of 2.3 cents per mcf. The court recognized that these
contracts were made in good faith and that they represented the best
available deal that could be made at the time.44 However, in 1960 gas
purchase contracts were executed at a price of 16 cents per mcf. The
lessor brought suit in that year seeking royalties based upon these
higher prices.
The court interpreted the lease strictly,45 stating, "they [the parties]
stipulated in plain terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of the
market price at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises. This
clearly means the prevailing market price at the time of the sale or
use." 46 Furthermore, as the time of the sale was defined as the time of
delivery,47 the ruling allowed the lessors to receive royalties based on
the prevailing price at the time of delivery. The majority relied heavily
on the Foster decision.48 Because the Foster decision was based upon
the term "when run '49 and there was no such term in the Vela lease,
the Vela decision has been criticized for its reliance on Foster.0
The rule in Texas was further developed in Exxon Corp. v. But-
ler51 and Exxon Corp. v. Middleton.52 The Butler decision primarily
reiterated the court's approach in Vela. 3 In Middleton the court reaf-
firmed the Vela decision that the market value means the prevailing
market value at the time of the sale and that the sale occurs at the time
of delivery.5 4 In addition, although the court in Vela had acknowl-
44. Id. at 870. The trial court's finding of good faith was not attacked.
45. Id. at 871.
46. Id. The court was unsympathetic with the lessees argument, reasoning that they could
have agreed that the royalty should be a fraction of the amount realized by the lessee from its sale.
47. Id. It was decided that royalties were to be measured from prevailing market prices at
the time of the sale. The court then stated that gas was not sold at the time of the contract but
rather at the time of delivery to the purchaser. Id.
48. Id. The court relied on the statement in Foster that Atlantie's inability to make a contract
with an escalation provision was beside the point. "It [Atlantic] made the gas sales contract with
full knowledge of this obligation [to pay royalties] and did nothing to protect itself... ." Id. The
Foster court stated, "the fact that increases in market prices have made the lease obligation
financially burdensome is no defense." Id.
49. 329 F.2d at 488. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Texas Oil.& Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 880 (dissenting opinion); Morris,
supra note 7 at 75; Note, The Market Value Controversy: Exxon v. Middleton, 16 TULSA L.J. 559,
560 (1981).
51. 585 S.W.2d 881 (rex. Civ. App. 1979), afppealdismissed, 619 S.W.2d 399 (1981).
52. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), modfed, 613 S.W.2d 240, rehearing, 619 S.W.2d
477 (1981).
53. 585 S.W.2d at 884. The court affirmed the court of civil appeals which stated that market
value means the "prevailing market value at the time of the sale, and the sale occurs at the time of
delivery to the purchaser." Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. 571 S.W.2d at 357.
[Vol. 17:566
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edged the comparable sales test,55 Middleton enlarged upon the Vela
holding. 6
In Middleton the court, considering the factors identified in Vela, 57
arrived at several conclusions. First, the relevant market area is the
field in which the gas was produced." Second, market price is to be
determined by reference to comparable sales.5 9 Third, the price under
long term purchase contracts is not necessarily the market price, but
may be considered along with evidence of comparable sales °.6  Finally,
the mathematical average of all the prices paid in the field is not the
final answer to determining the market value. It appears, however, that
an expert opinion on the average price paid in the field which is corrob-
orated by comparable sales may afford a basis for determining market
value.6t As a result of Middleton lessees have been subject to increas-
ingly higher ratios of their revenue going to satisfy royalty claims of
lessors.
Also of interest are the Kansas Supreme Court decisions in
Waechter v. Amoco Production Co .62 and Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp .63
The Waechter case, decided in 1975, involved a fairly typical lease
which calls for royalties based upon the proceeds if sold at the well, or
based on the market value at the well if marketed off the leased prem-
ises.64 The court rejected the argument that proceeds and market value
55. In Vela the court based its definition of comparable sales on that stated in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 1961 (5th Cir. 1946) that comparable sales are those which are
"comparable in time, quantity, quality, and availability of [marketing] outlets." 571 S.W.2d at
358. One author has stated that the omission of the term quantity from the comparable sales test
in Vela is immaterial. See Note, Evidence Admissible to Determine Market Value of Gasfor Roy-
aly Purposes: The Vela RationaleAfrmed by Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 17 HoUSTON L. REV.
1047, 1052 n.23 (1980).
56. See Note, The Market Value Controversy: Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 16 TULSA L.J. 550,
552 (1981).
57. 571 S.W.2d at 360. The court stated that under Vela there were four factors to consider
in "determining the market value of gas: (1) the relevant marketing area is the field in which the
gas is produced; (2) [a] reasonably prudent operator, in the exercise of good faith, may be re-
quired to enter into a long term contract (however, such gas purchase contract between lessee and
a third party is not necessarily the 'market price'. .. ); (3) the comparable sales to be considered
are those comparable in time, quantity, quality and availability of marketing outlets; and (4) the
'average price' method is not conclusive of market price but is more than a scintilla of evidence
which, along with corroboration of comparable sales from the field, will support a trier of facts
finding as to market value." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 360.
61. See id.
62. 217 Kan. 489, 537 P.2d 228 (1975).
63. 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
64. 217 Kan. at -, 537 P.2d at 231.
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were intended to be synonymous. 65 But, the court concluded that all
the leases involved in the case were ones in which the gas was sold at
the well and were therefore "proceeds" leases.66 In other words, royal-
ties were to be calculated on the proceeds obtained from the sale. The
court thus ruled in favor of the lessee by arbitrarily categorizing the
leases regardless of their terms. There were over 48 leases with various
types of clauses, and the dissent argued that it was improper to label
them all proceeds leases.67 The dissenting opinion advocated use of the
intent of the parties and criticized the majority's use of the term "pro-
ceeds" out of context:68 "To ascertain the intention of the parties...
use of the words 'gas marketed', 'market value', and 'sold' cannot be
ignored. ' 69 Although the majority held for the lessees, the rationale
was so weak that it was of little significance.
Lightcap represents a further extension of the rule defining market
value introduced in Waechter, bringing Kansas into line with those ju-
risdictions holding against the lessee. In Lightcap the producer con-
tracted for a fixed price for a specified time and thereafter for a "fair,
just and reasonable price. '' 70  Furthermore, any dispute over the price
after the specified time was to be resolved by arbitration. The contract
called for the dedication of the entire natural gas production to inter-
state markets, thus introducing the additional factor of Federal Power
Commission (FPC) regulation.71 When the arbitrated rates were sub-
65. Id. at -, 537 P.2d at 249. The court stated: "Nor can we say the parties used the term
'proceeds' and 'market value' as equivalents in the royalty clauses .... The term 'proceeds' was
used only in context with the phrase 'if sold at the well' while the term 'market value' was used in
the alternative phrase 'or if marketed by lessee off the leased premises'." Id.
66. Id. (the justices agreed the royalty should be one-eighth of the proceeds if sold at the
well).
67. Id. at -, 537 P.2d at 256. The dissent argued for construing the lease against the lessee
on the theory that the lessee had prepared an ambiguous lease.
68. Id. ("the single word 'proceeds' is lifted out of context from the clause and is said to
control without regard to any other language in the clause") (Schroedter, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 257.
70. 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 4.
71. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) is empowered to set ceiling prices for gas in ac-
cordance with the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976). The issue of whether
the FPC has jurisdiction over the royalty owner was addressed in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463
F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Mobil, the court held that the FPC did not have jurisdiction over the
royalty owner or over a dispute between a royalty owner and his producer over the amount of
royalties to be paid because royalty owners are not natural gas companies under the NGA. Id. at
259. In Lightcap, the court reviewed the decision" in Mobil and decided that jurisdiction over
disputes between royalty owners and lessees was not with the FPC but rather with the courts. The
court went on to hold that the existence of federal regulation over the rates which a producer may
receive is not an obstacle to the fixing of some higher rate as the market value of gas for the
purposes of computing royalties. 221 Kan. at -, 562 P.2d at 11.
It was necessary as a preliminary matter for the court to establish its jurisdiction over the
9
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mitted to the FPC, they were only partially approved and were ad-
justed downward. The producer paid royalties based on this FPC
approved price, and the royalty owners brought suit seeking royalties
based upon the arbitrated prices.
The court in Lightcap rejected the producer's argument that royal-
ties should either be based on the contract price or the FPC approved
price.72 In doing so, the court ruled that the existence of federal regula-
tions fixing the maximum rates a gas producer might receive from its
purchaser is no obstacle to the fixing of a higher rate as the market
value of gas it sells for the purpose of computing royalties under the
lease.73 The court stated that a market value lease calls for payment
based on the theoretical free market value without regard to govern-
mental regulations. 4
The Lightcap decision has been criticized for its reliance on the
intent of the parties in the face of unforeseen circumstances such as
changes in FPC regulations. 75 The holding appears to require a lessee
to foresee the changes in FPC price ceilings. Unlike Waechter the
court in Lightcap dealt with market value leases, yet what "market
price" is and what is required to prove it were not decided.76
A recent Louisiana case, Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 7 is sig-
nificant for its use of the rules of construction to determine the intent of
the parties and its conclusion that the intent of the parties is that royal-
ties be fixed and certain. In Henry the lessees had paid royalties based
dispute in light of the holding in Mobil. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. Commenting
on Mobil, Commissioner Foth stated, "the end result was that Mobil v. FPC left it open to the
courts.. to determine lease controversies between royalty owners [and] lessees." 221 Kan. at
-, 562 P.2d at 6.
72. 221 Kan. at -, 562-P.2d at 5 (royalty owners argued that the arbitrated price was the
market value).
73. Id. at-, 562 P.2d at 8.
74. Id. at-, 562 P.2d at 11.
75. Id. at-, 562 P.2d at 9. The dissent in Waechter had argued for construction against the
lessee. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. In Lighicap, the court, reflecting on the
Waechter dissent, stated that ambiguous instruments are to be construed strictly against their
draftsmen. Furthermore, in the case of oil and gas leases this normally means against the lessee
and in favor of the lessor.
76. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 30-31 (dissenting opinion). Justice Fromme stated:
The majority opinion completely disregards the question of what evidence may be neces-
sary to establish a market price. There was no evidence of market price in the record of
this case except the FPC ceiling prie.... In the present case the lessors argue that
certain aborted arbitrated figures on reasonable value somehow establish "market price
at the well." Not so.
Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 30-31.
77. 401 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
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on the amounts received under a twenty year purchase contract.78 For
seventeen years the lessors had accepted royalty payments from the les-
sees without objection, but in 1979 the lessors filed suit demanding that
the lessees pay royalties based upon the current value of gas.79
The district court defined market value in its ordinary sense to
mean the price which a thing might be expected to bring if offered for
sale in the market8" and concluded that, since natural gas cannot be
sold until it is delivered, the market value of gas sold obviously means
the current market value.81 The district court relied upon the rules of
construction that the clear language of the contract must be enforced
and that in case of ambiguity a contract must be construed against the
party who prepared it.82
The court of appeals concluded that the district court's reliance on
these rules was misplaced.83 Since there was no evidence that the lessee
had prepared the lease, construction against the lessee on that basis was
erroneous.84 Furthermore, because the court found that the intent of
the parties was ascertainable, such a construction was unnecessary. 85
In determining the intent of the parties the court considered two
factors. First, for seventeen years the lessor had never objected to the
method of payment by the lessee. The court stated that this "long-
standing acquiescence" by the lessor was sufficient in itself to deter-
mine that the parties had intended the market value to mean the
amount realized.86 Second, expert testimony about the origin of the
78. Id. at 601.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 603.
81. Id. The district court reasoned that the sale of minerals still in the ground is not a sale.
Gas becomes subject to sale only after it is reduced to possession. Only then can market value be
determined. In reversing the district court the court of appeals held that this was not the intent of
the agreement. Id. at 604.
82. Id. at 606. The district court relied upon three rules of construction. First, the contract is
the law between the parties. Second, the clear language of the contract is to be enforced. Third,
an ambiguous instrument is to be construed against the preparer. The court of appeals recognized
all three as valid construction rules, but regarded the latter two as not pertinent.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court stated:
By its use of the ambiguity rule, it appears that the trial court found the leases ambigu-
ous and construed them against the defendants-lessees on the assumption that the lessees
prepared the leases. There was no evidence presented from which the court could rea-
sonably have concluded that the lessees in these cases had prepared the leases.
Id.
85. Id. The court stated, "Even if we assume that the lessees did not prepare these leases,
however, we are bound, first, to ascertain the common intention of the parties.., rather than to
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market value clause indicated that, historically, market value clauses
were designed to protect the lessee. Because of the expense involved in
bringing gas to the market, the clause was developed to provide for
royalties based upon the market value of the gas at the well rather than
the point of sale where the price was higher.8 7
According to the leases, royalties for gas sold at the well were to be
based upon the amount realized. 8 Clearly this was meant to be the
contract price. However, the court also held that the clause calling for
royalties based on market value for gas sold off the premises should be
interpreted similarly.89 The court stated that "since the parties clearly
intended for the royalties to be certain and fixed in one instance, we
think the only reasonable interpretation of the . . . lease royalty
clauses is that the parties intended for the royalties to be certain and
fixed in both instances." 90 Therefore, the lessor was to receive the cur-
rent market value at the time the gas was committed to the purchaser,
the time of the contract.91
It is clear that, with the exception of Louisiana, the decisions have
been unsympathetic to the lessee's situation. In view of the decision in
Apache Gas, it was speculated that Oklahoma might not follow those
other jurisdictions but would define market price as based upon the
contract price.92 It was not until the Tara decision that this speculation
was confirmed.
IV. THE DECISION IN TAR4 PETROLEUM CoRP. v. HUGHEY
The decision in Tara follows logically from that inApache Gas. In
Tara the lessors claimed that their royalty should be measured by the
price the ultimate purchaser, El Paso Gas, was paying the first pur-
chaser, Jarrett, rather than that which Jarrett was paying the lessee,
Wilcoy, because the ultimate purchaser's price better represented the
market price.93 In light of decisions such as Vela and Lightcap the les-
sor's argument had validity. But the court in Tara held that the les-
87. Id. at 607.
88. Id. at 608. There was no dispute among the parties that the amount realized meant the
contract price.
89. Id. The court stated, "In light of this clear intent [that the amount realized was the
contract price], and after considering the testimony of Mr. Bolton. . .we conclude that in the
other instance [i.e. for gas sold off the premises] the parties to . . .the leases intended for the
lessor's royalties to be tied to the gas sales contract." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Ashabranner, supra note 29, at 184-85.
93. 630 P.2d at 1272.
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sors were entitled to royalties based only upon the contract executed
between the lessee and the first purchaser. As to the contrary authority
from other jurisdictions, the court stated that "by and large, the results
in those cases have been criticized." 94
One of the key elements of the decision in Tara was the recogni-
tion of the realities of the gas industry first mentioned in Apache Gas.95
Two of the major factors relied upon by the court were the necessity for
long-term contracts and the lessee's duty to market. 96 In fact, the court
credits the existence of such royalty disputes to the necessity that the
lessee enter long-term contracts in order to sell the gas.97 Certainly, as
gas prices increase, lessors with more recent leases, and therefore more
recent purchase contracts, receive higher royalties than those with older
leases. The court recognized that this phenomenon appears unfair at
first glance. 98 But the court also believed that lessors and lessees know
and consider the necessity of these long-term contracts when they nego-
tiate their leases. 99 Most importantly, it is fundamentally unfair to the
producer to hold him to the long-term purchase contract, thus limiting
his revenue, while insisting that he pay higher and higher royalties out
of this fixed revenue."°° The court used the following scenario to make
the point clear:
Under their contract the producers received 320 per mcf the
first year. The royalty share of that amount, one-eighth, is 4¢.
Yet by the end of the first year the first purchaser, Jarrett, was
receiving nearly $1.28 for the gas. One eighth of the $1.28 is
16€. So if royalty were measured by the price El Paso Natural
Gas paid Jarrett, the lessors' royalty would have quadrupled
in one year to one half of the producers' revenues. And all
the while, of course, the producers' revenue per mcf remained
constant. 10
94. 630 P.2d at 1273. The decision in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So. 2d at 600,
was issued the same month and presumably was not available to the Oklahoma court.
95. 509 P.2d at 112 ("[ilt has never been suggested that long term contracts . . . are
unnecessary").
96. 630 P.2d at 1272 ("[tlhe kind of dispute we have before us today arises because lessees, in
order to market gas, must ordinarily enter into long-term gas purchase contracts"). See notes 102
& 104 infra and accompanying text.
97. 630 P.2d at 1272.
98. Id. ("As the current price of gas increases, lessors with more recent leases, more recent
wells, and more recent gas purchase contracts receive royalty on higher prices than their counter-
parts with older production. Understandably this seems unfair to the lessors.")
99. Id. at 1273.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court went on to state that this would not be fair to the producers: "We do not
[Vol. 17:566
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A second factor in the decision is the lessee's duty to market. 10 2 It
is, indeed, this duty that has helped to create the controversy, for it is
the duty to market which dictates the use of long-term contracts.0 3 As
one author quoted in the decision stated:
Add to this well-known reality of the business [long term con-
tracts] the lessee's implied convenant obligation to market
with dispatch, and in the opinion of the writer the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of the lessee as a matter of law,
with inquiry restricted to whether the sale was a reasonable
contract when made."
Acknowledging the necessity for long-term contracts, the court
concluded that "as long as our law recognizes long-term gas purchase
contracts as binding in the face of escalating prices, the law should not
penalize the producer who was forced into the contract in large meas-
ure by his duty to the lessor."'0 5
But the Tara decision should not be taken to mean that the market
price will, at all times and in all situations, be the contract price. Under
the decision in Tara, as long as the gas purchase contract was entered
into at arm's-length, and in good faith "with the best price and term
available to the producer at the time,' '" °" and as long as the lease roy-
alty clause is based on market price at the well, then the market price is
the contract price.'0 7 The court went on to state that if the contract was
not reasonable when entered, or if it was not a fair and representative
contract at the time in the field, the lessee has then failed to discharge
his duty to market the gas and a different result would obtain.'08 The
decision places on the lessor the burden of proving that the gas
believe that the lessors .. or. . .the assignee-producers ever contemplated that the lessors'
royalty could be half of what the producers received for the gas." Id.
102. Id. ("[o]nce a producing well is drilled a producer has a duty to market the gas").
103. Long-term contracts have been recognized as a necessity in the industry due to the
lessee's duty to market. Natural gas, unlike oil, normally is not produced and then stored to await
sale. Because of this, it is difficult to measure its value at the time it is actually produced. See 509
P.2d at 113. Long term contracts are necessary to meet financing, construction, and operational
costs of production. See The Market Value Controversy, supra note 50. The court in Exxon Corp.
v. Middleton cited two reasons why long term contracts have been so prevalent. First, a substan-
tial financial investment was involved in producing gas from the well and getting it to the eventual
user. Producers would not be likely to make such an investment without some assurance that the
gas would be purchased. Second, gas is normally used as quickly as it is produced. 571 S.W.2d at
352.
104. 630 P.2d at 1273-74 (quoting from 3A W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS § 589 (2d ed. W. Flittie
Supp. 1980)).
105. 630 P.2d at 1274.
106. .d. at 1273 (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1274.
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purchase contract was unreasonable. 9 Therefore, for the lessor to ob-
tain a royalty based upon something higher than the contract price, he
must prove that the gas purchase contract which his lessee entered out
of his duty to market the gas was unreasonable or not at the best price
obtainable.I" Even though the situations in which a lessee would enter
into an unreasonable contract would be few,' the lessor does have the
opportunity of showing that the contract was not sufficient to meet the
duty to market. ' 2
The court in Tara concluded that the burden of proof thus im-
posed upon the lessor was not met." 3 The court also denied the plain-
tiffs equitable argument that Tara and Jarrett should not be enriched
to the detriment of the royalty owners." 4 The producers and the les-
sors had joined and filed one brief as appellees and argued that Tara
and Jarrett were jointly owned and subject to the control of two men. I
The court expressed its opinion that care should be taken to prevent
lessors from being deprived of royalties or defrauded by lessees enter-
ing into illusory or collusive assignments or purchase contracts." 16 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that where a lessee "is paying royalty on one
price, but on resale a related entity is obtaining a higher price, the les-
sors are entitled to their royalty share of a higher price. The key ele-
ment is common control of the two entities.""' 7 But here common
control was never shown, and the equitable argument was therefore
109. Id. ("[tihe burden of proving that a gas purchase contract was unfair or unreasonable at
the time it was entered into is on the lessor seeking additional royalty").
110. Id.
Ill. Id. ("[q]uite naturally lessors want to receive as much royalty as possible, but lessees in
their own interest seek as good a price as they can get for gas").
112. Id. The lessor must show that the contract was not reasonable when entered into and
that, therefore, the lessee has not met his duty to market. For a discussion of the duty of the lessee
to market gas, see E. KuNrz, A TREAnsE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS 320 (1967). The duty was
reaffirmed in the Tara decision. See supra notes 96 & 102 and accompanying text.
113. 630 P.2d at 1274. The court stated:
In this case there is no hint that the contract was unfair or unreasonable.. . . The
producers made the best deal they could to market the gas. The price they negotiated
was the highest being paid in the field at the time .... Of course the producers were
themselves concerned with making the best deal possible, but they acted in good faith
and represented their lessors well ... And they did not themselves profit in any way
from the increases in gas prices. Under these circumstances we hold that the "market
price".., is the same as the "contract price" of the gas purchase contract.
Id.
114. Id. at 1275.
115. The two men were Joe Bob Brown and Dean McNaughton. Joe Bob Brown is not re-
lated to the producer Coy Brown.
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denied. 18
The lessors argued that even if Tara and Jarrett were not under
common control, the court should ignore their separate legal exist-
ence."19 In such cases involving independent third parties, to receive a
higher royalty, the lessor must establish that the separate corporate
existence was designed to perpetrate a fraud or that one of the two
entities is organized so that its affairs are conducted merely as an in-
strumentality of the other.' 2
0
The lessor, and the producers who joined him on appeal, failed to
establish common control of Tara and Jarrett. 2 ' Furthermore, the ad-
ded burden which arises when a contract is negotiated with a third
party was not met.' 22 The court, therefore, rejected the plaintiff's and
producer's argument and reversed the judgments against both Tara Pe-
troleum and Jarrett'1 3
V. ANALYSIS
The controversy over the definition of market price and market
value is not new. The argument that is often made by the lessor is that
he should receive a royalty based upon the actual worth of the gas.
Central to the argument that market price is the contract price, how-
ever, is the contention that the courts must respond to the realities of
the industry. 24 That the lessor feels cheated when he sees other royalty
owners receiving higher royalties because their leases were negotiated
118. Id. The record showed that at the time Tara received the original lease and when it
assigned it to Coy Brown, Joe Bob Brown and Dean McNaughton each owned 50% of Tara.
Furthermore, at the time of trial (March 1979) Brown owned all of Tara and was President of both
Tara and Jarrett. However there was no indication of the ownership of Jarrett and the court
refused to speculate about its ownership.
119. Id. Because there was no showing of common control of the two organizations, Tara and
Jarrett were assumed to be separate and independent. In order for the lessor to receive higher
royalties, it would have to be shown that their separate existence was a sham.
120. Id.
121. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
122. 630 P.2d at 1276 ("[t]here is no indication that the producers ever acted under the direc-
tion or influence of either Tara or Jarrett. And the fact that Jarrett made the royalty payments for
the producers-a common practice in the industry-is not significant").
123. Id.
124. The realities of the industry, such as the duty to market and the necessity of long term
contracts, have been recognized previously in Oklahoma. See supra note 105 and accompanying
text. The same factors, although recognized in Vela, have been minimized as the courts in other
jurisdictions have reasoned that a lessee's failure to protect himself adequately in these contracts
was no defense. 429 S.W.2d at 871. However, the decision in Henry was based primarily on the
facts of the case which indicated that the parties had agreed on the contract price as the relevant
measure of market value for more than three-fourths of the lease period. 401 So. 2d at 607.
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when prices were higher is understandable.1 25 However, to hold for the
lessor and against the lessee for that reason works an injustice to the
lessee.
The lessee has a duty to market the gas, and in this duty he is often
forced to enter long-term contracts. Because it is in the lessee's interest
to obtain the best possible price, gas purchase contracts generally reflect
the best agreement that can be made. 26 The lessor generally knows
that the lessee will have to enter a long term contract and that his reve-
nues will be limited. 27 If the lessee has made a good faith effort and
has reached the best agreement he can, it seems unjust to consider his
contract binding yet, also, to require him to pay increasing royalties. 128
The facts in Tara permit the assumption that the contract was
made at arm's-length. 2 9 The contract which Jarrett entered into to
purchase the gas from Wilcoy was neither unfair nor unreasonable.
The result obtained seems clearly correct. Indeed, the court in Tara
stated that, "if it is not at a minimum fair and representative of other
contracts negotiated at the time in the field, then a different result ob-
tains." ' 30  The decision does not extend to every situation. The con-
tract price will not prevail in situations where the contract was
unreasonable. But if the contract were reasonable, as it generally is,
then fairness would call for the market price to be the same as the con-
tract price. That in hindsight the contract might not appear the best
that could have been made, especially in light of ever-rising prices, is
irrelevant. The standard to be applied under Tara is whether the con-
tract was reasonable at the time it was negotiated.'
3
'
As one author discussed, many courts have resolved ambiguities in
oil and gas leases in favor of the lessor. 32 This rule of construction has
125. 630 P.2d at 1272. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
126. Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 1273 ("lessors and lessees know and consider [the necessity for long-term contracts]
when they negotiate oil and gas leases"). Similarly, in Henry the court noted that "It strains the
imagination to conclude that the parties intended for the royalties to be at all times uncertain and
subject to change, rather than determinable from the terms of the gas sales contract." 401 So. 2d
at 608.
128. Id. at 1273.
129. Id. at 1274. Similarly, in Henry the court found: "There was no dispute that negotiations
between Ballard & Cordell and American Louisiana [the purchaser] were conducted in good faith
and at arm's length and that the resulting contract was very favorable to both the [lessors] as well
as [lessees]." Id. In this regard the court concluded that the price was as good or better than
comparable sales at that time and that the price escalation clause was among the best contained in
any such sales. 401 So. 2d at 605.
130. 630 P.2d at 1274.
131. Id.
132. See Fischl, supra note 4, at 36.
[Vol. 17:566
17
Crane: Market Value and Long-Term Purchase Contracts: Tara Petroleum Cor
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TAAR PETROLEUM CORP v. HUGHEY
been criticized as having no real foundation. 133  The court in Tara
shows sympathy for this position when quoting Summers: "[I]n the
opinion of this writer the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
lessee as a matter of law. .. .34 In Henry the court rejected the rule
that an ambiguous lease should be construed against its drafter, the
lessee. Because there was no evidence that the lessee had prepared the
lease, construction against the lessee on that basis was found to be
erroneous. 1
35
The decision in Tara is ultimately more fair than that of other
jurisdictions.136 It is more closely in line with the contemplated results
of both parties when they entered the lease. As the court remarked,
surely the lessor never expected that his royalty could be half of what
the producer received for the gas. 137 That this rule is advantageous and
fair to the lessee is obvious. But at the same time it does not create an
undue hardship on the lessor, because he receives the benefit of the
agreement which he made with the lessee.
The decisions in other jurisdictions which allow for royalties based
upon the prevailing market price create a better situation for the lessor,
but they are catastrophic to the lessee. They allow the lessor to receive
a higher and higher percentage of the fixed revenue of the lessee. This
result cannot be justified as within the intentions of the parties when
they negotiated the lease.' 38 One author speculated that a lessor und6r
these decisions could be forced to pay a royalty higher than the amount
of revenue he receives through the contract. In such an instance the
lease would no longer be producing in paying quantities, and the lessee
might also be subject to losing his lease.' 39 This author concludes that
"it seems inappropriate to measure the lessee's obligation in hind-sight
133. Id.
134. 630 P.2d at 1273.
135. 401 So. 2d at 606.
136. Seesupra note 10 and accompanying text; Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448,-,
562 P.2d 1, 9-11, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. 1968).
137. 630 P.2d at 1273. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
138. See Morris, supra note 7, in which Dean Morris stated:
It is probably not correct to say in construing the royalty clause that the lessor and lessee
infact intended "market price" to mean what it was construed to mean in Vela; neither
would it be correct to say that they infact intended "market price" to mean that price
which the lessee was able to obtain in a long term gas sales contract. . . . It is... more
nearly correct to say that by construing "market price" to mean that price which the
lessee is able to obtain by using his best business judgment is a construction which is
likely to be in accord with the probable intention ofthe average lessor and lessee.
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 81.
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by substituting new found business judgment in the light of gas prices
which are high because of an energy shortage."' 4 °
Not only is Tara supportable for the policy reasons mentioned, it
is directly in line with the only other Oklahoma case dealing with the
market price of gas.' 4 1 Apache Gas, decided in 1973, was chiefly con-
cerned with construction of Oklahoma's - Gross Production Tax
Code.' 42 In Apache Gas, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
Oklahoma Tax Commission to recover taxes paid under protest. The
court, in holding for the plaintiffs, indicated that the Commission does
not have the right to place the same gross value on the gas purchased
under earlier contracts as a larger volume of gas purchased under more
recent ones. The Commission may require taxes based on the prevail-
ing market only "where the prices (already) paid are less than the prices
thatprevailed in thefield at the time .. . ."' The court held, there-
fore, that if the contract price was the best price obtainable for gas in
the field at that time, then the contract price is the market price for
purposes of tax liability.' 44
Finally, the Tara decision sets a clear standard for future cases in
Oklahoma. Unlike the decisions in other jurisdictions such as Light-
cap, the Tara holding is unambiguous and is not subject to distinction
based on minor differences in lease terminology. Tara makes it clear
that the market price is the contract price except where the contract
does not reflect the best terms available at the time. With the decision
firmly established, predictability as to the effect of market price clauses
in leases becomes possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Tara is clearly the better rule. The results in other
jurisdictions are unsupportable in light of the realities of the gas indus-
try. Not only is Tara consistent with Apache Gas, on balance its rule is
fair to both parties. It avoids the injustice of having a lessee pay an
increasing amount in royalties while being limited in his revenues by
the long-term contract which he negotiated primarily out of his duty to
the royalty owner. The decision is consistent with the intent of both
parties. Tara and Henry make it clear that it is possible to determine
140. Id. at 83.
141. 509 P.2d at 109.
142. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
143. 509 P.2d at 113 (emphasis in the original).
144. Id. at 113.
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that intent, and to construe a lease against the lessee merely because he
is presumed to be the drafter is erroneous in such instances. Where the
evidence indicates that the lessee made a good faith effort to obtain the
best deal possible, logic and fairness demand that market value, for
purposes of determining gas royalty payments, be interpreted to mean
the contract price rather than the prevailing market price.
Charles Bretton Crane
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